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1 Introduction
Competitive equilibrium has mostly coexisted with constant or decreasing returns to
scale technologies in the economic literature. Welfare theorems and existence results of
Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Arrow and Debreu (1954), Debreu (1959)) build
upon the concavity assumption on production functions. The reason is the presence
of a major obstacle against the operation of the price system under increasing returns
(strictly convex production functions), namely the problem of unbounded input demands
and output supplies for any given non-zero output prices.
Despite diﬃculties, there have been some attempts to introduce increasing returns
into Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium. The common practice has been to regulate eco-
nomic activity through marginal cost pricing or average cost pricing (See Beato (1982),
Brown and Heal (1983), Guesnerie (1975), Khan and Vohra (1987) and Vohra (1988,
1992).) But, this reputable remedy also yields some side eﬀects. In marginal cost pricing
equilibrium, producers face operating losses that must be subsidized by the regulatory
body, whereas in average cost pricing equilibrium they have an incentive to expand out-
puts at the quoted prices. One must also take into account the welfare losses caused by
the informational rents oﬀered to the regulated producers under an incentive-compatible
mechanism when either demand or cost information is private.
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This paper shows that unregulated decentralized equilibrium is viable in an increasing
returns economy under cash-in-advance constraints.1 We assume that our economy
operates with outside money and we get rid of unbounded input demands by constraining
firms to use money as working capital in financing their transactions in the factor market.
However, there still remains a problem as the first-order necessary condition (Euler
equation) is not suﬃcient for a maximum when the production function is strictly convex.
We overcome this technical obstacle by imposing assumptions on the basic settings of
the model. Thereby, we ensure that (i) corner solutions to Euler equation cannot be
optimal, (ii) interior solution to Euler equation exists and is unique.
Cash-in-advance constraints have extensively been used in the literature to model
the transactions demand for money as these constraints require that individuals hold
cash to finance some or all of their transactions. Clower (1967) is the first to present a
basic cash-in-advance model in which individuals are liquidity constrained to purchase
consumption goods. In such a setting the classical result of superneutrality continues
to hold, i.e. anticipated inflation yields no welfare eﬀects. In Lucas (1980, 1984, 1990)
and Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), liquidity constraints are similarly imposed only on
consumers’ purchases of a subset of commodities or assets. In this class of studies money
inflation leads to a fall in real money holdings and hence a reduction in the quantity
of cash goods consumed. Such a distortion in output is shown to be eliminated by
a deflationary money supply rule in line with the representative agent’s rate of time
preference.
Another strand of the same literature looks at the influences of cash-in-advance con-
straints on inifinite-horizon economies with production. Some examples are Cooley and
Hansen (1989), Fuerst (1992), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
Evans (1997, 1998) and Basci and Saglam (1999, 2003a, 2003b). These studies all es-
tablish an operational Phillips curve between anticipated inflation and employment that
is downward-sloping along with the presence of a working capital premium as the gap
between real wage and productivity. This gap can be completely eliminated, as pro-
posed by numerous studies, by a deflationary policy (Friedman rule) that equates the
1The existence problem of competitive equilibrium under increasing returns to scale technologies was
recently studied by Ata and Basci (2004) in a finite-horizon representative-agent framework. In that
paper money is not fiat and does not grow; the utility function is logarithmic, the production function
is quadratic and no welfare analysis for monetary policy is conducted.
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real rate of return on money to the time preference of the representative agent. A similar
rule maximizing employment and output is obtained as the discount rate of the most
patient agent in the model of Basci and Saglam (2005), which allows for heterogeneous
producers.
The current paper also demonstrates that the slope of the long-run Phillips curve
may depend on the way monetary policy is conducted. We show that anticipated money
inflation may have expansionary as well as contractionary eﬀects on equilibrium employ-
ment and output depending on the allocation of money transfers among producers in
the economy. We obtain this result in a model with overlapping heterogenous producers
who are distinguished as ‘young’ and ‘old’ and assign unequal valuations to monetary
savings in each period.
It is worth emphasizing that the incorporation of cash-in-advance constraints in an
overlapping generations framework attempts to complete the missing part of ‘monetary’
models. In traditional overlapping generations models with money, agents hold money
as an asset that helps to smooth out consumption over time and it is possible that the
money is not valued when the rate of return on other assets is greater than that of
money. One can argue that it is inappropriate to classify these conventional models as
‘monetary’, and there exists room for reintroducing money into OLG models by means
of liquidity constraints. Indeed, the studies by Crettez, Michel and Wigniolle (1999) and
Erdogan and Saglam (2006) are two recent examples of this endeavor. Crettez, Michel
and Wigniolle (1999) consider a Diamond OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints
in the good market transactions and study conditions under which money is neutral and
is not neutral. They also characterize the monetary policy that implements the optimal
allocation of resources. Erdogan and Saglam (2006) impose liquidity constraints on both
factor market and good market transactions in order to analyze the full eﬀects of money
inflation in a simple production economy with decreasing returns, and obtain a striking
dependence of the shape of long-run Phillips curves on the form of the monetary policy.
Our model considers overlapping generations of consumer-producers and consumer-
workers living for two periods. We deviate from the setup of Erdogan and Saglam
(2006) in that producers own increasing returns to scale (IRTS) technologies during
their lifetime to convert the single factor of production, labor, into a single good of
consumption. Just before the end of their lives, producers transfer their technologies as
bequest to the generation after next so that in every period each newborn producer is
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endowed with a production plant. We also assume that the labor market opens before
the good market in each period and transactions in both markets are payable on a cash
basis, only.2
Private money endowments through bequests are absent in the model, thus money
transfers from the government to at least one of the two groups of agents, producers and
workers, are indispensable for the operation of the economy. By the assumed sequencing
of the two markets, workers can, in every period, earn the cash they need for the planned
purchases in the good market by selling labor in the factor market. Therefore, we assume
for simplicity that workers do not receive money transfers from the government either
when young or when old.
Unlike workers, producers begin their lives by entering first a market (labor market)
in which they choose to buy rather than to sell. After production takes place with the
employed labor, the good market opens and transactions determine the end-of-period
cash balance of each producer. This balance is chosen as positive by liquidity-constrained
producers, when they are young, to finance the planned factor payments in the next
period. It is now clear that money as a working capital needs to be transfered to
newborn producers, only. Nonetheless, we also let old producers receive (pay) money
transfers (taxes) not only to allow the monetary authority to budget transfers but also
to show that the distribution of money matters for the real eﬀects of money inflation.
For a definition of monetary competitive equilibrium where nominal prices are sta-
tionary when normalized with respect to the money growth rate, we are able to give the
full characterization under increasing returns if and only if the money growth rate is not
too low. We argue that suﬃciently high levels of money inflation make cash-in-advance
constraints binding and eliminate both workers’ and producers’ incentives for hoarding
money. Money is used as a working capital in all types of transactions.
We analyze the competitive equilibrium and immediately note that the quantity of
money in circulation only determines nominal price levels, i.e. money is neutral. But,
money is not superneutral because the rate of money growth influences real variables as
well. However, we deviate from the traditional non-superneutrality result which states
2Basci and Saglam (2003a) paper shows that if the good market opens before the factor market, the
competitive outcomes are the same as those obtained in the absence of such cash constraints. Liquidity
constraints have some real eﬀects only if the factor market opens before the good market. Barth and
Ramey (2001) provides empirical support for the relevance of such liquidity constrained models at the
industry and aggregate levels.
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that money inflation in the presence of liquidity constraints curbs the commodity supply
and demand. Indeed, we show that the impact of money inflation on the equilibrium
outcome can be in both directions depending upon the dynamic allocation of money
transfers between young and old producers.
An increase in the growth rate of money supply, through a rise in old producers’
share in money transfers, decreases the equilibrium real wage rate and employment,
which can be called as a modified ‘Tobin (1965) eﬀect’ with capital - the intensive factor
of production in the literature - being replaced in our model by labor that is indeed
the single factor. Thus, we obtain between anticipated inflation and employment the
conventional downward-sloping Phillips curve commonly derived in the cash-in-advance
literature.
At the opposite extreme, an increase in the growth rate of money supply through a
rise in young producers’ share in money transfers leads to an increase in the equilibrium
real wage rate and employment (a ‘reverse Tobin eﬀect’). We thus recover an upward-
sloping Phillips curve relation between anticipated inflation and employment analyti-
cally. While inflation increases, we show that employment converges to its upper-bound
determining the frontier of the economy.
In order to analyze the impact of money inflation on aggregate output, we simulate
the equilibrium with an artificial set of model parameters. We find that the Phillips
curve relations between inflation and employment extend to similar relations between
inflation and output for each transfer allocation rule.
The sensitivity of our results to the distribution of money transfers completely stems
from both the heterogeneity of producers and the fact that generations overlap in each
period. The fact that generations overlap renders useless making an assumption of
money being tax backed since there is always production on the part of young producers,
and thus leaves room for the monetary policy to aﬀect the slope of the long-run Phillips
curve. As for the importance of heterogenity of producers, notice that in the absence
of money bequests, producers never supply the good market in the last period of their
lives, as it is optimal for them to consume the whole produced output before dying. On
the contrary, young producers, awaiting to live one more period, sell in the good market
to smooth out consumption as well as to collect cash for the expected wage payments
in the next period. So, in every period only young producers sell consumption good to
workers. Since the tightness of cash-in-advance requirements young producers face in
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the factor market determine the quantity of output they supply in the good market, an
increase in money inflation relieves the liquidity constrained economy in terms of a rising
employment and output level only if young producers’ relative share of money transfers
is increased.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic settings of the model.
Section 3 defines and characterizes the monetary competitive equilibrium. Section 4
provides monetary analysis of the equilibrium. Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks. Finally, proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
The basing settings of the model are described as follows.
Agents: There are overlapping generations of two types of agents, ‘workers’ and
‘producers’, distinguished by the index i ∈ {w, p}. Each generation lives for two periods.
At the beginning of each period t appears a new generation, called generation t. The
subscripts {1,t} and {2,t} respectively stand for a ‘young’ agent of generation t and an
‘old’ agent of generation t − 1 who meet in period t. No starting point is assumed for
the time horizon, therefore at each period there are young and old agents of consecutive
generations. There is no population growth either, so at each period there are equal
numbers of young and old agents of each type that we denote by ni for i ∈ {w, p}.
Commodities: There are two commodities in each period: the single factor of pro-
duction, labor, and a nonstorable consumption good that can be produced with labor.
Factor Endowments: Workers have equal amounts of labor endowments in the two
periods of their lives, denoted by l¯w1 = l¯
w
2 = l¯
w > 0. Producers do not have labor
endowments.
Valuation of Leisure: Workers value leisure in units of the consumption good through
the function vw(.). Producers do not value leisure.
Production Technology: Each old producer of generation t, just before dying, leaves
his technology fp(.) as bequest to a distinct member of generation t + 2 so that each
producer is born with a technology available for use during his lifetime. We assume that
the technology fp(.) has increasing returns to scale (IRTS), as fp(.), fp
0
(.) and fp
00
(.) > 0.
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We also assume that workers do not own production technology, i.e. fw(.) = 0 in every
period.
Utilities: The representative worker and producer of generation t have the life-
time utilities Uw(cw1,t + v
w(ew1,t)) + β
wUw(cw2,t+1 + v
w(ew2,t+1)) and U
p(cp1,t) + β
pUp(cp2,t+1),
respectively. Here, ci1,t and e
i
1,t respectively denote consumption and leisure of the rep-
resentative agent of type-i when young, and ci2,t+1 and e
i
2,t+1 consumption and leisure
of the same agent when old. We assume that U i(.) and vw(.) are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly concave. We also assume
A0. vw
0
(0) =∞ and vw0(l¯w) = 0.
A1. lim
x→0
vw
0
(l¯w − ψx)
fp0(x)
= 0 for all ψ > 0.
A2. Up
0
(0) =∞.
A3. Up
0
satisfies multiplicative separability, i.e. for any c1, c2 ∈ IR++, Up
0
(c1c2) =
Up
0
(c1)U
p0(c2).
A4. fp(l)/g(fp
0
(l)) is increasing in l ∈ IR++, where g is the inverse function of 1/Up
0
.
Assumptions A0−A3 help to make sure that an interior solution to the optimization
problem of producers exists and corner solutions are not optimal. Assumption A4 is
very crucial for the existence result of this paper as it ensures that the interior solution
is unique and Euler equations are suﬃcient for optimality.
Note that IRTS production functions fp(L) = θlγ together with the leisure function
vw(e) =
√
e − e/(2l¯w) and the CRRA utility functions Up(c) = cη/η, where θ > 0,
γ ∈ (1, 2) and η ∈ (0, 1/γ), satisfy assumptions A0 − A4. The function Up(c) = ln(c)
is also admissible. In the light of these special classes of technologies and utilities,
assumption A4 can be interpreted as that for a given convex production technology,
utility function of producers must be suﬃciently concave.
Money and the Government: The economy operates with fiat money. By mt, we
denote the aggregate money stock at the end of period t that evolves over time according
to
mt+1 = (1 + α)mt,
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where α > −1. Government changes the money stock in the economy through lump-
sum transfers/taxes at the beginning of each period. While no worker receives money
transfer during his lifetime, each of the young and old producers living in period t
receive xp1,t = α1mt−1/n
p and xp2,t = α2mt−1/n
p units of money transfer, respectively.
We assume α1 + α2 = α so that money transfers received lead to the desired money
inflation. We allow the taxation of old producers as long as α2 > −1. But, we must
have α1 > 0 inevitably, since newborn producers need cash for their wage expenses in
the factor market.
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Figure 1.– Time flow of cash and technology
Now we describe the flow of money in the economy (that we depict in Figure 1 along
with the flow of technology across generations). A type-i agent of generation t−1 starts
his first period with the initial money transfer xi1,t−1 and ends it with the balance m
i
1,t−1.
The same agent receives the transfer xi2,t at the start of his second period, and ends his
life with the balance mi2,t. (Note that x
w
1,t−1 = x
w
2,t = 0 for all t, by asssumption.)
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The following table summarizes the basic structures of the model:
TABLE I
Summary of Basic Structures
Workers Producers
Young Old Young Old
Labor Endowment l¯w1 = l¯
w > 0 l¯w2 = l¯
w > 0 l¯p1 = 0 l¯
p
2 = 0
Valuation of Leisure vw (Concave) vw (Concave) vp = 0 vp = 0
Production Technology fw = 0 fw = 0 fp (IRTS) fp (IRTS)
Period−t Money Transfer xw1,t = 0 xw2,t = 0 x
p
1,t = α1mt−1/n
p xp2,t = α2mt−1/n
p
Trade Institution: For a given economy E = { ni, βi, U i, vi, f i, l¯i1, l¯i2, xi1,t, xi2,t | for
all t and i ∈ {w, p} }, a trade institution is the description of choice variables for each
type of agents, price variables, constraints on the given choice variables determined by
the given prices, and a feasibility requirement for the collective choices of agents.
Choice variables of type i agents when they are young and old respectively:
ci1,t, c
i
2,t+1 : consumption
qi1,t, q
i
2,t+1 : (+) commodity demand, (-) commodity supply
li1,t, l
i
2,t+1 : (+) labor demand, (-) labor supply
mi1,t, m
i
2,t+1 : end-of-period money holding
Money prices:
ωt, ωt+1 : nominal wage rates per unit of labor
pt, pt+1 : money prices per unit of good
All prices and wages are expressed in terms of money, which serves as numeraire.
Timing of Transactions: Under the assumption that the labor market opens before
the good market, the sequence of transactions that take place in the economy in period
t can be listed under the following four subperiods:
9
T1. Type i agent starts period t with a money balance that is equal to the sum of
money transfers/taxes and the balance carried from the end of period t− 1. (This sum
is xi1,t for each young agent whereas m
i
1,t−1 + x
i
2,t for each old agent in period t, where
mi1,t−1 represents the end-of-period t− 1 money holding.)
T2. Labor market opens. Factor trade takes place at the nominal wage rate ωt and
all wage bills are paid in advance of production.
T3. Good production occurs with the labor lp1,t and l
p
2,t employed by young and old
producers, respectively.
T4. Good market opens. Transactions are made by cash at the nominal good price
pt. Hence, the end-of-period t money balances realize as
mi1,t = x
i
1,t − ωtli1,t − ptqi1,t
mi2,t = x
i
2,t +m
i
1,t−1 − ωtli2,t − ptqi2,t
for each of the young and old agents, respectively.
Agents’ Problems: The representative agent of type i faces the following utility
maximization problem given his lifetime endowment structure (l¯i1, l¯
i
2) and strictly positive
prices {ωt,ωt+1, pt, pt+1}:
max U i(ci1,t + v
i(l¯i1 + l
i
1,t)) + β
iU i(ci2,t+1 + v
i(l¯i2 + l
i
2,t+1))
subject to:
mi1,t = x
i
1,t − ωtli1,t − ptqi1,t (1)
mi2,t+1 = m
i
1,t + x
i
2,t+1 − ωt+1li2,t+1 − pt+1qi2,t+1 (2)
−l¯i1 6 li1,t 6
xi1,t
ωt
(3)
−l¯i2 6 li2,t+1 6
mi1,t + x
i
2,t+1
ωt+1
(4)
−f i(l¯i1 + li1,t) 6 qi1,t 6
xi1,t − ωtli1,t
pt
(5)
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−f i(l¯i2 + li2,t+1) 6 qi2,t+1 6
mi1,t + x
i
2,t+1 − ωt+1li2,t+1
pt+1
(6)
ci1,t = f
i(l¯i1 + l
i
1,t) + q
i
1,t (7)
ci2,t+1 = f
i(l¯i2 + l
i
2,t+1) + q
i
2,t+1 (8)
Equations (1) and (2) describe the end-of-period cash holdings. Constraints (3) and
(4) must be read as that in each period supply of labor is bounded from above by the
labor endowments of workers whereas demand for labor is constrained by the amount
of cash with which producers enter the factor market. Similarly, constraints (5) and
(6) respectively impose on good supply and good demand both technology and liquidity
constraints. Finally, equations (7) and (8) state that per-period consumption of each
agent equals the sum of whatever he has produced and purchased.
3 Monetary Competitive Equilibrium
We are now ready to define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 3.1. The list { ωt, ωt+1, pt, pt+1, ci1,t, ci2,t+1, li1,t, li2,t+1, qi1,t, qi2,t+1, mi1,t,
mi2,t+1 | for all t and i ∈ {w, p} } is a Monetary Competitive Equilibrium (MCE) for the
economy E , if ωt,ωt+1, pt, pt+1 > 0 and
(i) {ci1,t, ci2,t+1, li1,t, li2,t+1, qi1,t, qi2,t+1,mi1,t,mi2,t+1} solves the maximization problem of each
type-i agent for all i ∈ {w, p} under the sequence {ωt,ωt+1, pt, pt+1}
(ii) nw(lw1,t + l
w
2,t) + n
p(lp1,t + l
p
2,t) = 0
(iii) nw(qw1,t + q
w
2,t) + n
p(qp1,t + q
p
2,t) = 0
(iv) nw(mw1,t +m
w
2,t) + n
p(mp1,t +m
p
2,t) = mt
(v) ωt+1/ωt = pt+1/pt = mt+1/mt = 1 + α
(vi) cij,t+1/c
i
j,t = l
i
j,t+1/l
i
j,t = q
i
j,t+1/q
i
j,t = 1 for all i ∈ {w, p} and j ∈ {1, 2}.
(vii) mw1,t = m
w
2,t+1 = 0.
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Condition (i) states that representative agents make optimal choices under perfect
foresight of future prices and price taking behaviour. Conditions (ii)-(iv) ensure the
clearing of the three markets. Condition (v) is the stationarity of the nominal variables
as normalized by the money growth rate. Condition (vi) denotes the symmetry of real
variables across generations. Finally, condition (vii) calls for workers not to hold any
end-of-period money balances after the good market transactions, which ensures that
every unit of currency in the economy can get its proper use as a working capital in the
factor market in every period.
To characterize equilibrium, we shall first obtain the reduced-form problem of a type-
i agent. For this purpose, we eliminate ci1,t, c
i
2,t+1 and q
i
1,t, q
i
2,t+1 from the respective
maximization problems, using the equality constraints (1)-(2) and (7)-(8). Then, we
restrict ourselves to the clearing of the labor and money markets alone, since the good
market will automatically clear as well, thanks to a version of Walras’ law applicable to
our case.
Using xw1,t = x
w
2,t+1 = f
w(.) = 0, we obtain the reduced-form problem faced by each
worker of generation t as:
max
{mw1,t,mw2,t+1,lw1,t,lw2,t+1}
Uw
µ−mw1,t − ωtlw1,t
pt
+ vw(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¶
+ βwUw
µ
mw1,t −mw2,t+1 − ωt+1lw2,t+1
pt+1
+ vw(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¶
subject to:
0 6 mw1,t 6 −ωtlw1,t (9)
0 6 mw2,t+1 6 mw1,t − ωt+1lw2,t+1 (10)
−l¯w1 6 lw1,t 6 0 (11)
−l¯w2 6 lw2,t+1 6
mw1,t
ωt+1
(12)
Similarly, the reduced-form problem faced by each producer of generation t becomes:
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max
{mp1,t,mp2,t+1,lp1,t,lp2,t+1}
Up
µ
xp1,t −m
p
1,t − ωtl
p
1,t
pt
+ fp(l¯p1 + l
p
1,t)
¶
+ βpUp
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1 −m
p
2,t+1 − ωt+1l
p
2,t+1
pt+1
+ fp(l¯p2 + l
p
2,t+1)
¶
subject to:
0 6 mp1,t 6 xp1,t − ωtlp1,t + ptfp(l¯p1 + lp1,t) (13)
0 6 mp2,t+1 6 mp1,t + xp2,t+1 − ωt+1lp2,t+1 + pt+1fp(l¯p2 + lp2,t+1) (14)
0 6 lp1,t 6
xp1,t
ωt
(15)
0 6 lp2,t+1 6
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ωt+1
(16)
The next proposition addresses two issues: the set of money growth rates sustaining
an equilibrium and the complete characterization of the unique eqilibrium.
Proposition 3.1. Monetary Competitive Equilibrium { pt,ωt, pt+1,ωt+1, ci1,t, ci2,t+1,
li1,t, l
i
2,t+1, q
i
1,t, q
i
2,t+1,m
i
1,t,m
i
2,t+1, | i = w, p } of the economy E
(i) exists if for all t
1 + α > max{βw, βpUp0(cp2,t+1)/Up
0
(cp1,t)} and (17)
1 + α2 ∈
³
βp
fp
0
(lp2,t+1)l
p
2,t+1
fp(lp1,t)
Up
0
(cp2,t+1)
Up0(cp1,t)
, 1
i
(18)
(ii) is uniquely characterized by (19)-(34) for all t:
ω∗t
p∗t
=
βp
1 + α
fp
0
(l∗p2,t+1)
Up
0
(c∗p2,t+1)
Up0(c∗p1,t)
(19)
ω∗t
p∗t
= vw
0
(l¯w1 + l
∗w
1,t ) (20)
ω∗t+1
p∗t+1
= vw
0
(l¯w2 + l
∗w
2,t+1) (21)
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nw(l∗w1,t + l
∗w
2,t ) = −np
µ
xp1,t
ω∗t
+
m∗p1,t−1 + x
p
2,t
ω∗t
¶
(22)
q∗w1,t = −
ω∗t
p∗t
l∗w1,t (23)
q∗w2,t+1 = −
ω∗t+1
p∗t+1
l∗w2,t+1 (24)
q∗p1,t = −
m∗p1,t
p∗t
(25)
q∗p2,t+1 = 0 (26)
l∗p1,t =
xp1,t
ω∗t
(27)
l∗p2,t+1 =
m∗p1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ω∗t+1
(28)
c∗i1,t = q
∗i
1,t + f
i(l¯i1 + l
∗i
1,t), i = w, p (29)
c∗i2,t+1 = q
∗i
2,t+1 + f
i(l¯i2 + l
∗i
2,t+1), i = w, p (30)
m∗w1,t = 0 (31)
m∗w2,t+1 = 0 (32)
m∗p1,t =
mt
np
(33)
m∗p2,t+1 = 0 (34)
Proof. See Appendix.
The two conditions in Proposition 3.1-(i) are suﬃcient for the existence of MCE. In
addition, inequality (17) is also necessary for that the money holding plans stated in
equations (31)-(34) are optimal for workers and producers. The part of (18) that is not
necessary for the existence of MCE is that 1 + α2 ≤ 1, which restricts the monetary
authority to inflationary or deflationary policies that never transfer money to the old
producers. The other part of (18) is both necessary and suﬃcient for that the optimal
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consumption of each young producer is positive.
A traditional result we obtain in line with the previous literature on cash-in-advance
models (Basci and Saglam, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Crettez, Michel and Wigniolle,
1999) is that the real wage rate never exceeds the marginal product of labor, apparent
from Euler equation (19) along with condition (17) in Proposition 3.1-(i). The intu-
ition underlying Euler equation is that increasing consumption in period t by reducing
savings for the next period by ∆m units yields to a young producer a marginal util-
ity of Up
0
(cp1,t)(∆m/pt), where ∆m/pt is the amount of additional consumption. On
the other hand, with ∆m units of reduction in period t + 1 money holdings, the labor
demand of the producer, when old, falls by ∆m/wt+1 units, which implies a reduction
of fp
0
(lp2,t+1)∆m/wt+1 units in output. The decrease in the utility of the producer due
to the fall in output in period t + 1 then becomes βpUp
0
(cp2,t+1)f
p0(lp2,t+1)∆m/wt+1. In
equilibrium, where money prices grow at the money inflation rate, the net marginal
benefit of transferring money from period t to period t+ 1 is zero only if equation (19)
is satisfied.
The observed wage-productivity gap in (19) can be interpreted as a premium accruing
to producers from the use of money as a working capital. Indeed, it is the presence of
this gap that makes cash-in-advance constraints binding for producers and money be
held for transaction motive.
By Proposition 3.1-(i), money growth rate 1+α cannot fall below the marginal rate of
substitution, βw, of workers at a stationary consumption plan; therefore no young worker
has any incentive to hoard money by carrying cash balances to the next period. Instead,
each young worker spends his entire wage earning in the good market. Additionally, by
the optimality of consumption plans both workers and producers leave the economy at
the end of their second periods without any cash balances. So, as clear from equations
(31)-(34), end-of-period money balances are nonzero only for young producers, who have
chosen to hold cash to pay wage receipts in the coming period.
The diﬀerence in the attitudes of young and old producers toward holding money
gives rise to the nonstationarity of the monetary competitive equilibrium within gener-
ations. While the quantity of output supplied by producers in the good market is nil
in the second period, it is not so in the first period as dictated by the aforementioned
optimal money holding plan.
As we shall see in the next section, the crucial part of the above proposition is
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labor demand by each old and young producer as given by equations (19) and (27),
respectively. On the opposite side of the factor market, labor supply curves of each
young and old worker are given by equations (20) and (21), respectively. It is easy to
see that we have a conventional upward-sloping aggregate labor supply curve due to the
strict concavity of the leisure function. In addition, supply of labor does not change
over time, since workers own the same amount of labor endowment in each period of
their lives. The equilibrium real wage rate is therefore constant. In result, equations
(23), (24), (29) and (30) altogether imply the same amount of consumption for workers
in every period.
4 Monetary Analysis of Equilibirum
This section seeks to investigate the interaction between money and real equilibrium
variables in the economy.
For ease of notation, we will henceforth suppress the superscript (*) that marks
equilibrium variables. We recall from the previous section that aggregate labor supply
is increasing in the real wage rate. We also observe from equations (20) and (21) that
supply of labor depends on neither the level nor the growth rate of money stock in the
economy.
To analyze the equilibrium in the labor market, let us now consider the demand side.
We rewrite equation (19), which represents labor demand of an old producer, as
ωt
pt
=
βp
1 + α
fp
0
(lp2,t+1)
Up
0
(fp(lp2,t+1))
Up0(−lp2,t+1(ωt/pt)(1 + α)/(1 + α2) + fp(l
p
1,t))
(35)
using (25), (26), (29) and (30). Hence we observe that the rate of growth, but not the
level, of money stock aﬀects the labor demand by an old producer. Similarly, the labor
demand of each young producer depends on the money growth rate if old producers’
ratio of money transfers to the money stock remains constant. This is evident from
lp1,t = α1mt−1/(n
pωt) obtained by using (27) and the definition of x
p
1,t. Now using
lp2,t+1 = (m
p
1,t + x
p
2,t+1)/ωt+1 = (1 + α2)mt−1/(n
pωt), we get
lp1,t =
α1
1 + α2
lp2,t+1. (36)
However, even with this simple intertemporal relation that producers’ demand for labor
must satisfy in equilibrium, it is still quite diﬃcult to analyze the demand by an old
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producer as it stands in equation (35). So, to simplify matters further, we henceforth
assume fp(L) = lγ, where γ > 1, and Up(c) = ln(c). Then, equation (35) becomes
ωt
pt
=
βpγ
1 + α2 + βpγ
1 + α2
1 + α
(lp1,t)
γ
lp2,t+1
. (37)
Using (36), labor demand curve of an old producer further reduces to
ωt
pt
=
βpγ
1 + α2 + βpγ
α
γ
1
(1 + α)(1 + α2)γ−1
(lp2,t+1)
γ−1. (38)
Similarly, the reduced-form labor demand of a young producer satisfies
ωt
pt
=
βpγ
1 + α2 + βpγ
α1
1 + α
(lp1,t)
γ−1. (39)
Finally, we obtain aggregate labor demand ldt = n
p[lp1,t+ l
p
2,t+1] = n
p[(1+α)/(1+α2)]l
p
2,t+1
in reduced form as
ωt
pt
=
βpγ
1 + α2 + βpγ
α
γ
1
(1 + α)γ
(ldt )
γ−1
(np)γ−1
. (40)
Clearly, aggregate labor demand is increasing in the real wage rate. This result is
against the common intuition in economics that demand by a profit maximizing firm
for a factor of production falls if its unit cost has increased in real terms. However, we
should be aware that such an intuition rests upon the assumption of diminishing marginal
products, which has mostly been taken for granted in the litareture. Here, the presence
of increasing returns to scale (or rising marginal products) leads producers to respond
to wage rises by expanding their aggregate demand for labor while the boundedness of
producers’ choices is ensured by cash-in-advance constraints.
Figure 2 below depicts workers’ total supply of labor, lst = −nw(lw1,t + lw2,t+1), and
producers’ total demand for labor, ldt with respect to the real wage rate wt/pt. (Hence-
forth, we assume v
000
1 > 0 and f
p000 < 0 for a convex labor supply function and concave
labor demand function, respectively. Note that assumption A3 checks that labor de-
mand is steeper than labor supply at the origin, ensuring a unique equilibrium in the
labor market.)
Our first remark is that money is neutral, i.e. the quantity of money has no eﬀect on
the equilibrium real wage rate, employment and output, for neither supply nor demand
curve in the labor market depends upon the level of money.
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Figure 2. – Labor demand and supply curves
The next corollary aims to address a related issue: the impact of money inflation on
the equilibrium outcome under two extreme distributions of money transfers.
Corollary 4.1. An increase in the growth rate α of money supply (i) decreases the
equilibrium real wage rate, aggregate employment and young producer’s output if the ra-
tio α1 of young producers’ transfers to money stock remains constant (ii) increases the
equilibrium real wage rate, agregate employment and young producer’s output if the ratio
α2 of old producers’ transfers to money stock remains constant.
Proof. See Appendix.
The first part of the above result is familiar to us from the previous literature on cash-
in-advance models with infinitely-lived representative agents owning decreasing returns
to scale (DRTS) technologies.3 Even the (nonconventional) second part of the corollary
is not due the availability of increasing returns in production but due to the presence of
heterogenous producers in the economy, as Erdogan and Saglam (2006) obtains a similar
result in an OLG framework with DRTS technologies. It is evident in our model that in
any time period only young producers supply the good market (for the sole purpose of
collecting cash required for the next period’s factor payments), since old producers find
3See, for example, Basci and Saglam (2005).
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it optimal to consume the last period’s output entirely before dying. Then, it is intuitive
that money inflation is productive in terms of rising employment only if it relaxes young
producers’ liquidity constraints.
If the ratio of transfers received by young producers to the existing money stock
is held constant (Corollary 4.1-(i) ), an increase (a decrease) in the money inflation
(deflation) relieves old producers in the factor market and consequently all workers in
the labor market. However, the resulting rise in nominal wages makes young producers
more liquidity constrained in the labor market and this aﬀects planned aggregate supply
adversely. In eﬀect, good prices rise faster than factor prices, leading to a decrease in
the real wage rate and in the aggregate employment. Hence we obtain a Phillips curve
with a stable negative tradeoﬀ between anticipated inflation and employment.
Oppositely, if the ratio of transfers received by old producers to the money stock
is held constant (Corollary 4.1-(ii) ), an increase in the money inflation relaxes the
liquidity constraints faced by young producers as well as all workers. The expansion in
supply plans increases real wage rate, hence aggregate employment, inspite of the upward
pressure in the good prices resulting from the increase in planned money spendings by
workers. Now, we obtain an upward-sloping Phillips curve between anticipated inflation
and employment.
We should note from the equilibrium relation lp2,t+1 = l
p
1,t(1 + α2)/α1 that the terms
lp1,t and (1+α2)/α1 always move in opposite directions under the two described transfer
rules in Corollary 4.1. So, the influences of money growth on old producers’ labor
demand and output are ambiguous. We cannot draw any conclusions about the impact
of inflation on the aggregate output, either.
In order to uncover the otherwise unobvious interaction between inflation and output,
we simulate the model for the set of parameters hβp = βw = 0.95, np = nw = 100,
γ = 1.5, l¯w = 1i using the leasure function vw(e) = √e− e/(2
√
l¯w), where e ∈ [0, l¯w].
We first fix α1 to 0.1, and vary the money growth rate α by changing the ‘transfer to
stock ratio’ α2 of old producers in increments of 0.20 between -0.90 and -0.10. The results
reported in Table II below show that decreased money deflation curbs the aggregate
labor demand ldt and individual labor demands l
p
1,t and l
p
2,t+1 of each young and old
producer. In eﬀect, the individual output levels in columns five and six and aggregate
output Qt = n
p[fp(lp1,t) + f
p(lp2,t+1)] in column seven fall. Thus, we get a downward-
sloping Philips Curve relation between anticipated inflation and output. Consumptions
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of young and old producers also decrease with falling money deflation. This is apparent
from columns six and eight, recalling that cp2,t+1 = f
p(lp2,t+1).
TABLE II
Equilibrium Outcome Associated with Various Levels of
Transfer/Stock Ratio for Old Producers
α2 l
d
t l
p
1,t l
p
2,t+1 f
p(lp1,t) f
p(lp2,t+1) Qt c
p
1,t ωt/pt (rrwg)t
-0.90 136.25 0.68 0.68 0.56 0.56 112.46 0.04 0.39 0.69
-0.70 46.21 0.12 0.35 0.04 0.20 24.33 0.01 0.07 0.92
-0.50 14.51 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.04 4.58 0.00 0.02 0.96
-0.30 5.40 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 1.08 0.00 0.01 0.98
-0.10 2.36 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.99
Table II also verifies a direct implication of Corollary 4.1 for the influence of inflation
on the consumption of each young and old worker. Falling money deflation leads to
a dramatic fall in the real wage rate. Since per-period labor supplied by each worker
ldt /(2n
w) falls with reduced aggregate demand ldt , workers consume less in equilibrum.
The final column of Table II reports the widening relative real wage rate gap, (rrwg)t,
defined as the wage-productivity gap (ωt/pt)−fp
0
(lp2,t+1) as a fraction of the productivity
fp
0
(lp2,t+1).
We now simulate the artificial economy described above for a money transfer rule
lying at the other extreme. We set α2 to -0.1, and vary young producers’ money transfer
to money stock ratio α1 in increments of 0.20 between 0.10 and 0.90. This change in the
distribution of money transfers aﬀects results in the direction one would partially infer
from Corollary 4.1-(ii). Table III shows that inflating money now stimulates aggregate
output. Hence, we can derive an upward-sloping Phillips curve between anticipated
inflation and output.
Decomposing the positive impact of inflation with respect to the two types of pro-
ducers at an individual level, we observe in the above table that demand for labor as well
as supply and consumption of the final good by each young and old producer increase
with money inflation. Our simulations also demonstrate a rise in the real wage rate. In
eﬀect, labor supplied and output consumed by young and old workers increase. Finally,
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we observe that the wage-productivity gap in relative terms narrows down as the money
inflation becomes higher.
TABLE III
Equilibrium Outcome Associated with Various Levels of
Transfer/Stock Ratio for Young Producers
α1 l
d
t l
p
1,t l
p
2,t+1 f
p(lp1,t) f
p(lp2,t+1) Qt c
p
1,t ωt/pt (rrwg)t
0.10 2.36 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.99
0.30 29.59 0.07 0.22 0.02 0.10 12.47 0.01 0.04 0.94
0.50 62.79 0.22 0.40 0.11 0.26 36.26 0.04 0.10 0.89
0.70 87.12 0.38 0.49 0.24 0.34 57.84 0.09 0.17 0.84
0.90 103.74 0.52 0.52 0.37 0.37 74.71 0.14 0.22 0.80
What we learn from the above results is that optimal money supply rule depends on
the way transfers are allocated. A monetary authority must set the inflation rate α at the
level that is produced by the the highest α1 and lowest α2 in their admissible domains,
so as to maximize the aggregate employment (and possibly the aggregate output as
suggested by the simulations in Tables II and III.) The lower bound for α2 is explicit
in (18) whereas there exists no upper bound for α1. So, under the suggested money
allocation which sets the transfer to stock ratio of old producers at the lowest possible
rate, the optimal growth rate of money (the upper bound for money transfers received
by young producers) is limited by only the printing capacity of the monetary authority.
But, we should notice that the marginal impact of inflation on the equilibrium outcome
is diminishing. As the inflation rate α increases, the varying term α1/(1+α) in equation
(40) approaches to ‘one’, yielding the frontier of the aggregate demand curve. Clearing
the supply in the labor market with this limit curve of demand, we can find the finite
supremum of the output level that an ever-growing money inflation would lead to in
equilibrium.
The unboundedness of the optimal inflation rule must not be very annoying though,
for we should notice that our model is missing costs of inflation other than the direct
welfare costs (benefits in our case). Enriching our model with ingredients such as menu
costs, competitiveness in the world market and reputation eﬀects, we may also get
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a finite positive rate of money growth that balances the trade-oﬀ between the direct
welfare benefits and indirect costs of inflation.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that unregulated decentralized equilibrium is viable in an IRTS econ-
omy involving overlapping generations of producers and workers who face liquidity con-
straints in both factor and good markets. Monetary competitive equilibrium is found
to exist if and only if the rate of money growth is suﬃciently high. The well-known
wage-productivity gap as a working capital premium is also established.
It is crucial for our results that firms cannot ‘perfectly’ commit to pay unlimited
amounts of wages to workers in goods, as soon as production has taken place. Obviously,
the introduction of commodity contracts (IOU’s by firms) or even a credit market (IOU’s
by banks) into our model to intermediate the timing mismatch between payments to
workers and production would not change the nature of our existence result as long as
firms were also facing constraints in issuing contracts or borrowing credits, which may
for example arise due to the need to collateralize loans. Yet, in order to simplify the
characterization of equilibirum we restrict our attention in this study to ‘outside money’
as the single working capital.
We find that money is neutral but not superneutral. As in Erdogan and Saglam
(2006), we show that the eﬀects of money inflation on the aggregate employment can be
in both directions depending upon the rule according to which the monetary authority
allocates money transfers between young and old producers. Conducting simulations, we
also get the missing analytical interaction between inflation and output. By the observed
monotonic relation between employment and output in equilibrium, the Phillips curve
relation between inflation and output is similar to the relation between inflation and
employment for each money transfer rule.
We should note that the sensitivity of the distribution of social welfare to the division
of monetary transfers between generations is not really new. As a matter of fact, Drazen
(1981) obtains a similar result in a finite life-cycle model with money in the utility
function. He shows that if seignorage goes to the the young then a Tobin eﬀect arises;
i.e. money inflation unambigously increases the demand for capital (per labor). He also
establishes that if seignorage goes to the old, then a reverse Tobin eﬀect arises. The
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possibility of a reverse Tobin eﬀect is also obtained by Ghossoub and Reed (2005) in an
infinite horizon model involving cash-in-advance constraints on consumption purchases.
Our integrated model which imposes cash-in-advance constraints in a finite life-cycle
(OLG) model clearly demonstrates that unregulated decentralized equilibrium is viable
and that the results of Drazen (1981) and Ghossoub and Reed (2005) may remain to
hold under increasing returns technologies, too.
Appendix
Lemma A.1. Let h : IR++ → IR++ be a function that is strictly increasing (decreas-
ing) and multiplicatively separable. Define g := 1/h. Then the inverse function g−1 is
strictly decreasing (increasing) and separable.
Proof. Both g and g−1 are strictly decreasing (increasing), since h is strictly increasing
(decreasing). It is also obvious that g is separable, since h is separable. Now pick any
c1, c2 ∈ IR++. Suppose
g−1(c1c2) 6= g−1(c1)g−1(c2).
Then the monotonicity and separability of g implies
g(g−1(c1c2)) 6= g(g−1(c1)g−1(c2))
or
c1c2 6= g(g−1(c1))g(g−1(c2)) = c1c2
which is a contradiction. Therefore, g−1 is separable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We will consider the two parts of the proposition sepa-
rately.
Part-i: We consider the reduced form maximization problem of workers:
max
{mw1,t,mw2,t+1,lw1,t,lw2,t+1}
Uw
µ−mw1,t − ωtlw1,t
pt
+ vw(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¶
+
βwUw
µ
mw1,t −mw2,t+1 − ωt+1lw2,t+1
pt+1
+ vw(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¶
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The first-order conditions for lw1,t and l
w
2,t+1 yield the respective labor supply curves
ωt/pt = v
w0(l¯w1 + l
ω
1,t) and ωt+1/pt+1 = v
w0(l¯w2 + l
ω
2,t+1). So, cash-in-advance constraint is
not binding for workers in the factor market.
Note that if 1+α > βw, the Euler condition associated with the controlmw1,t, becomes
− 1
pt
Uw
0¡
cw1,t + v
w(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¢
+
βw
pt+1
Uw
0¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
6 0,
using lw1,t = l
w
2,t+1 by (20) and (21); c
w
1,t = c
w
2,t+1 by (23), (24), (29) and (30), and
additionally pt+1 = pt(1 + α) by the stationarity of nominal prices. So, the money
holding plan mw1,t = 0 is optimal if 1 + α > βw.
If, on the contrary, 1 + α < βw, the Euler condition becomes
− 1
pt
Uw
0¡
cw1,t + v
w(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¢
+
βw
pt+1
Uw
0¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
> 0.
Then, by slightly increasingmw1,t over initial money endowment of x
w
1,t = 0 (hence slightly
increasing cw2,t+1 over c
w
1,t) workers can be better oﬀ. In that case, the plan m
w
1,t = 0 could
not be optimal.
The proof of the ‘if’ statement for inequality (17) is implicit in the proof of Part-ii-(b).
Finally, notice that the inequality 1+α2 > β
p f
p0(lp2,t+1)l
p
2,t+1
fp(lp1,t)
Up
0
(cp2,t+1)
Up
0(cp1,t)
in condition (18)
is suﬃcient for the equilibrium consumption
cp1,t = f
p(lp1,t)− l
p
2,t+1
ωt
pt
(1 + α)/(1 + α2)
= fp(lp1,t)−
βp
1 + α2
fp
0
(lp2,t+1)l
p
2,t+1
Up
0
(cp2,t+1)
Up0(cp1,t)
of each young producer to be positive. The remaining part of condition (18), namely
α2 ≤ 0, suﬃces for the existence of a solution to the Euler equation associated with the
producers’ problem, which is explicit in the proof of Part-ii-(b).
Part-ii: The proof consists of two parts: (a) Every MCE satisfies (19)-(34); (b) the
plan (19)-(34) is a MCE.
(a) Let {pt,ωt, pt+1,ωt+1, ci1,t, ci2,t+1, li1,t, li2,t+1, qi1,t, qi2,t+1,mi1,t, mi2,t+1, | i = w, p} be
a MCE. In Part-i of the proof, we showed that labor supply of each worker must satisfy
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(20) and (21) when young and old, respectively. Labor market clearing implies (22).
Equations (23),(24),(25),(26) follow from (1) and (2) given the optimal choices of money
holding, whereas (29) and (30) are restatements of (7) and (8) in equilibrium.
To derive the rest of the MCE plan, consider the reduced form maximization problem
of producers:
max
{mp1,t,mp2,t+1,lp1,t,lp2,t+1}
Up
µ
xp1,t −m
p
1,t − ωtl
p
1,t
pt
+ fp(lp1,t)
¶
+
βpUp
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1 −m
p
2,t+1 − ωt+1l
p
2,t+1
pt+1
+ fp(lp2,t+1)
¶
The first-order conditions for lp1,t and l
p
2,t+1, under the assumption that ωt/pt 6
fp
0
(lp2,t+1), become l
p
1,t = x
p
1,t/ωt and l
p
2,t+1 = (m
p
1,t + x
p
2,t+1)/ωt+1. That is, cash-in-
advance constraints are binding for producers in the factor market.
The objective of producers, then, reduces to
max
{mp1,t,mp2,t+1}
Up
µ−mp1,t
pt
+ fp
µ
xp1,t
ωt
¶¶
+ βpUp
µ−mp2,t+1
pt+1
+ fp
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ωt+1
¶¶
.
The Euler condition associated with the control mp1,t becomes
− 1
pt
Up
0
(cp1,t) +
βpfp
0
(lp2,t+1)
ωt+1
Up
0
(cp2,t+1) = 0.
Using the stationarity condition ωt+1 = (1 + α)ωt, we obtain (19).
(b) We have to prove that the plan (19)-(34) is optimal, individually feasible, sta-
tionary, symmetric across generations and satisfies aggregate feasibility (market clearing)
conditions.
(b-i) Optimality: We will check that both types of agents optimize under the pro-
posed prices and plans of action. For ease of notation, suppress the superscript (∗)
in equilibrium variables, hereafter. The optimality of lw1,t and l
w
2,t+1 were shown in
Part-i of the proof. Denote the objective function of type i agents as V i(mi1,t,m
i
2,t+1)
for i = w, p. Define V i1 (m
i
1,t,m
i
2,t+1) = ∂V
i(mi1,t,m
i
2,t+1)/∂m
i
1,t and V
i
2 (m
i
1,t,m
i
2,t+1) =
∂V i(mi1,t,m
i
2,t+1)/∂m
i
2,t+1.
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Now, we will verify that V w(mw1,t,m
w
2,t+1) is jointly concave in m
w
1,t and m
w
2,t+1. First
recall that
V w(mw1,t,m
w
2,t+1) = U
w
µ
−
mw1,t
pt
− ωt
pt
lw1,t + v
w(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¶
+ βwUw
µ
mw1,t −mw2,t+1
pt+1
− ωt+1
pt+1
lw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¶
.
Then
V w1 = −
1
pt
Uw
0 ¡
cw1,t + v
w(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¢
+
βw
pt+1
Uw
0 ¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
6 0,
since 1 + α > βw and cw1,t + vw(l¯w1 + lw1,t) = cw2,t+1 + vw(l¯w2 + lw2,t+1). Moreover,
V w2 = −
βw
pt+1
Uw
0 ¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
< 0
and
V w11 =
1
p2t
Uw
00 ¡
cw1,t + v
w(l¯w1 + l
w
1,t)
¢
+
βw
p2t+1
Uw
00 ¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
< 0
V w22 =
βw
p2t+1
Uw
00 ¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
< 0
V w12 = V
w
21 = −
βw
p2t+1
Uw
00 ¡
cw2,t+1 + v
w(l¯w2 + l
w
2,t+1)
¢
> 0.
Hence, the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite, and V w(mw1,t,m
w
2,t+1) is concave.
Similarly, the objective function of a representative producer is
V p(mp1,t,m
p
2,t+1) = U
p
µ
−
mp1,t
pt
+ fp
µ
xp1,t
wt
¶¶
+βpUp
µ
−
mp2,t+1
pt+1
+ fp
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ωt+1
¶¶
.
It follows that
V p2 = −
βp
pt+1
Up
0
µ
qp2,t+1 + f
p
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ωt+1
¶¶
< 0
V p22 =
βp
p2t+1
Up
00
µ
qp2,t+1 + f
p
µ
mp1,t + x
p
2,t+1
ωt+1
¶¶
< 0.
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So, we must have mp2,t+1 = 0.
Define m˜p1,t := m
p
1,t/wt+1, x˜
p
1,t := x
p
1,t/wt and x˜
p
2,t := x
p
2,t/wt for all t. It then follows
that V p(mp1,t,m
p
2,t+1) = V
p(m˜p1,twt+1, 0) that we simply denote by
V p(m˜p1,t) = U
p
µ
fp(x˜p1,t)−
wt+1
pt
m˜p1,t
¶
+ βpUp
¡
fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
¢
with an abuse of notation. Then we have
V p
0
(m˜p1,t) = −
wt+1
pt
Up
0
µ
fp(x˜p1,t)−
wt+1
pt
m˜p1,t
¶
+βpfp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)U
p0 ¡fp(m˜p1,t + x˜p2,t+1)¢ .
The rest of the proof aims to show the optimality of MCE plan for producers, and
involves three steps: First, we will show that there exists an interior solution to the
first-order condition for the problem of producers for all money growth rates satisfying
conditions (17) and (18). Second, we will prove that corner solutions cannot be optimal
and hence the optimal solution must be an interior one. The last step verifies that the
interior solution is unique.
Step 1. Note that −x˜p2,t+1 ≥ 0, since α2 ≤ 0 by (18). Then
m˜p1,t →−x˜
p
2,t+1 implies V
p0 →∞, and
m˜p1,t →
pt
wt+1
fp(x˜p1,t) implies V
p0 →−∞.
Now denote the set of feasible money holding plans by A = [−x˜p2,t+1, ptfp(x˜p1,t)/wt+1]
and its interior by int(A). One can easily show that int(A) 6= ∅ if and only if
− α2
1 + α2
lp2,t+1 <
fp(lp1,t)
βpfp0(lp2,t+1)
Up
0
(cp1,t)
Up0(c2,t+1)
which holds true thanks to condition (18). Then, we conclude by the continuity of V p
0
that there exists m˜p1,t∈ int(A) such that V p0(m˜p1,t) = 0.
Step 2. First consider the consumption plan cp1,t = f
p(x˜p1,t) + x˜
p
2,t+1wt+1/pt and
cp2,t+1 = 0 associated with the corner solution m˜
p
1,t = −x˜
p
2,t+1. Assumption A2 ensures
that producers have an incentive to slightly increase m˜p1,t and hence c
p
2,t+1 = 0 if int(A) 6=
∅.
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Next consider the consumption plan cp1,t = 0 and c
p
2,t+1 = f
p(x˜p2,t+1+ f
p(x˜p1,t)pt/wt+1)
associated with the corner solution m˜p1,t = ptf
p(x˜p1,t)/wt+1. Assumption A2 now ensures
that by slightly decreasing m˜p1,t, hence by slightly increasing c
p
1,t, producers become
better-oﬀ if int(A) 6= ∅. Therefore, no corner solution can be optimal.
Step 3. At an interior solution, the Euler condition becomes
Up
0
µ
fp(x˜p1,t)−
wt+1
pt
m˜p1,t
¶
=
βp
wt+1/pt
fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)U
p0 ¡fp(m˜p1,t + x˜p2,t+1)¢ .
Define g := (1/Up
0
)−1. The function Up
0
is strictly decreasing and separable, by assump-
tion. Thus, by Lemma A.1., g is strictly increasing and separable. Then
fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1) = g
Ã
βp
wt+1/pt
fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
1
Up0
¡
fp(x˜p1,t)− m˜
p
1,twt+1/pt
¢!
= g(βppt/wt+1) g(f
p0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)) (f
p(x˜p1,t)− m˜
p
1,twt+1/pt).
Then
0 = fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)− g(βppt/wt+1) g(fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)) (f
p(x˜p1,t)− m˜
p
1,twt+1/pt).
Denoting RHS of the above equation by h(m˜p1,t), we have h(m˜
p
1,t) = 0, as a restatement
of Euler equation. By step 1, there exists at least one choice of m˜p1,t that solves Euler
equation. We have h(m˜p1,t) > 0 if and only if
fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
g(β2pt/wt+1)g(fp
0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))
+ m˜p1,twt+1/pt > f
p(x˜p1,t).
Note also that
h0(m˜p1,t) = f
p0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
−g(βppt/wt+1)g0(fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))f
p00(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)(f
p(x˜p1,t)
−m˜p1,twt+1/pt) + g(β2pt/wt+1)g(fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))wt+1/pt,
and we have h0(m˜p1,t) > 0 if and only if
fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
g(βppt/wt+1)g0(fp
0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))f
p00(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
+
g(fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))wt+1/pt
g0(fp0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))f
p00(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
+ m˜p1,twt+1/pt > f
p(x˜p1,t).
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By assumption A4, fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)/g(f
p0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)) is increasing in m˜
p
1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1,
hence in m˜p1,t. Thus we have
fp(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
g(fp0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))
<
fp
0
(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
g0(fp0(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1))f
p00(m˜p1,t + x˜
p
2,t+1)
.
From the above inequalities we conclude that h0(m˜p1,t) > 0 for all m˜
p
1,t such that h(m˜
p
1,t) >
0, and therefore the solution of Euler equation is unique.
(b-ii) Individual feasibility: On the workers’ side, money demands in (31) and (32)
respectively satisfy constraints (9) and (10) at the lower bounds. Conditions (11) and
(12) are satisfied in the interior.
On the producers’ side, constraint (13) reduces to mp1,t 6 ptfp(l¯1+ lp1,t) at (27), which
holds true since cp1,t > 0. Whereas constraint (14) holds at the lower boundary, (15)
holds at the upper bound. Finally, (28) satisfies constraint (16) at the boundary.
(b-iii) Aggregate feasibility: By equation (22), labor market clears. The plans (23),
(24), (25) and (26) clear the good market, whereas the plans (31), (32), (33) and (34)
are consistent with the money market clearing.
(b-iv) Symmetry and stationarity: One can easily verify that in equilibrium (19)-(34)
the nominal variables are stationary whereas the real variables are symmetric across gen-
erations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. We prove the two parts of the Corollary separately.
Part-i: Using α1 + α2 = α, we can check that an increase in α causes aggregate
labor demand ldt in equation (40) to increase for all values of the real wage rate when
α1 is constant. Then the aggregate labor demand curve (40) shifts rightward while the
aggregate supply curve keeps its position in a plane where the real wage lies on the
vertical axis. Given the positive slope of the demand curve, the excess demand for labor
is eliminated by a lower real wage rate in equilibrium, the result being a fall in aggregate
employment. In eﬀect, labor demand lp1,t and the implied output f
p(lp1,t) of each young
producer will both decrease, which follows from the fact that lp1,t = [α1/(1 + α)]l
d
t /n
p
along with α1/(1 + α) > 0.
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Part-ii: When α2 is constant, an increase in α causes aggregate labor demand l
d
t to
decrease for all values of the real wage rate. Following the leftward shift in the aggregate
labor demand curve (40), the excess supply of labor is eliminated by a higher real wage
rate in equilibrium. Consequently, aggregate employment is higher in equilibrium. By a
reasoning similar to that in the proof of Part-i, labor demand lp1,t and the implied output
fp(lp1,t) of each young producer are higher, too. Q.E.D.
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